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THE LAST BEST HOPE: REPRESENTING
DEATH ROW INMATES
Esther F. Lardent* and Douglas M. Cohen**
Most lawyers are acutely aware of the limitations of our justice sys-
tem. Justice in America is slow, uncertain and erratic. The most dis-
turbing aspect of the justice system is its inaccessibility for persons
without resources. Unfortunately, that noble sentiment etched into the
stone of the United States Supreme Court building, "equal justice under
law," is often realistically translated as "equal justice-for those who can
pay for it."
Nowhere has the goal of equal justice under law been violated so
blatantly and so regularly as in the treatment of capital cases in our
courts. Most lawyers are no more familiar with death penalty represen-
tation than the public at large. We get our information from newspapers
and other media, even from Perry Mason and L.A. Law. Until very re-
cently, capital representation was the province of a small group of practi-
tioners; the bar in general was unaware of the terrible inequities faced by
those defendants whose lives were at stake.'
In the abstract, defendants in capital cases appear to be treated equi-
tably by the justice system. While a constitutional right to counsel for
indigent criminal defendants has been in existence for only twenty-five
years,2 defendants facing the death penalty have been assured access to
counsel since the 1930s. 3 In practice, however, the inadequate funding of
indigent defense systems and the politically charged nature of capital
cases render that assurance a sham. As Justice Thurgood Marshall
pointed out:
[C]apital defendants frequently suffer the consequences of hav-
ing trial counsel who are ill-equipped to handle capital cases.
* Esther F. Lardent, Esquire, is the Chief Consultant for the American Bar Associa-
tion's Postconviction Death Penalty Representation Project. Ms. Lardent is a graduate of the
University of Chicago Law School and a nationally known expert in the development and
administration of pro bono public programs.
** Douglas M. Cohen, a senior student at Duke University, plans to attend law school in
the fall of 1990. Mr. Cohen served as an intern for the American Bar Association's Postcon-
viction Death Penalty Representation Project in the summer of 1989.
1. See generally Hengstler, Attorneys for the Damned, 73 A.B.A. J., Jan., 1987, at 59-60;
Lane, Pro Bono and Death Row, 19 A.L.I.-A.B.A., CLE REv., Dec. 23, 1986, at 4-6.
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel at felony trials).
3. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right to counsel in capital cases).
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Death penalty litigation has become a specialized field of prac-
tice .... And even the most well-intentioned attorneys often
are unable to recognize and preserve and defend their clients'
rights.... Though acting in good faith, they often make seri-
ous mistakes.'
The reality of appointed counsel for indigent defendants at trial and on
direct appeal is that these attorneys are often inadequately compensated,
unaware of the complex procedure and jurisprudence in capital cases,
novices in the practice of law, and unable to obtain critically needed sup-
port services such as investigators and expert witnesses.
Inevitably, these systemic inadequacies have resulted in numerous
documented instances of deeply flawed representation.5 An attorney fa-
miliar with capital representation cited a particularly disturbing example
of ineffective assistance of counsel:
In one case the former Imperial Wizard of the local Klan repre-
sented a black defendant charged with raping and murdering a
white woman, referred to his client as a "nigger boy" in conver-
sations, fell asleep during meetings with the [district attorney],
and interposed both an insanity defense and a general denial
defense simultaneously.6
Unfortunately, such examples are not isolated. Documented cases
of inadequate representation include attorneys with serious substance
abuse problems,7 attorneys who fail to introduce any evidence whatso-
ever at the critically important sentencing phase of the trial," attorneys
who make inflammatory remarks at trial,9 and, most frequently, attor-
neys whose preparation for trial is pitifully inadequate even though the
trial is literally a matter of life and death.' 0
In addition to their failure to provide an adequate and zealous de-
fense, the overburdened attorneys in these cases often do not have the
resources to identify exculpatory evidence and the instances of
prosecutorial and police misconduct that appear with regularity in these
emotionally charged cases. For example, in a Florida case, a federal
judge found that the police withheld key evidence that would have sup-
4. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Remarks at the Judicial Conference of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (September 6, 1985) (on file at Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review).
5. See Hengstler, supra note 1, at 59-60.
6. Lane, supra note 1, at 4-6.
7. Hengstler, supra note 1, at 59.
8. Id. at 58-60.
9. Id. at 59.
10. Id. at 59-60.
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ported the defendants' alibi.1 1 In a Louisiana case" where a defendant
was sentenced to death on a rape conviction, the appellate court found a
series of constitutional defects in the prosecution of the case and in the
trial, which lasted less than one day. 1" The appellate court affirmed the
conviction, but set aside the imposition of the death penalty and re-
manded the case to the trial court for resentencing.14 Most notably, it
was subsequently discovered that the defendant's blood type did not
match that of the sperm found on the victim.15 The defendant was ulti-
mately freed. 6
The grave shortcomings in the trial and direct appeal phases of a
capital case are exacerbated by the situation which exists in the post-
conviction phases, in which collateral review 7 may be sought in state
and federal court. Two thousand, two hundred and ten inmates are pres-
ently on death rows throughout the United States. 8 A majority of these
people are entering or have entered the post-conviction stage of their
appeals. 19
Given the deficiencies that characterize the trial and direct appeal
stages, it is not surprising that the rate of reversal and remand in these
post-conviction reviews is very high, despite the narrow scope of that
review. One commentator has reported that the courts have granted re-
lief in sixty to seventy-five percent of capital habeas matters, as compared
to a rate of less than seven percent in non- capital cases.20 Judge John C.
Godbold of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
11. Jent v. State, 408 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1111 (1982), later
proceeding, 493 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1986), later proceeding, 798 F.2d 426 (11th Cir. 1986), va-
cated, 480 U.S. 901 (1987); Miller v. State, 415 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1158 (1983), later proceeding, 798 F.2d 426 (11th Cir. 1986), vacated, 480 U.S. 901 (1987). See
generally Von Drehle, Fairness Was Fatal Blow to Fast Executions, Miami Herald, July 11,
1988, at IA, col. 1.
12. State v. Ross, 343 So. 2d 722 (La. 1977); Von Drehle, supra note 11, at IA, col. 1.
13. Ross, 343 So. 2d at 728-29. See also Von Drehle, supra note 11, at IA, col. 1.
14. Ross, 343 So. 2d at 728.
15. Von Drehle, supra note 11, at IA, col. 1.
16. Id.
17. Collateral review, which is provided for by state and federal statute, is available after
the defendant has exhausted his direct appeals. These appeals, which are viewed in many
states as non-criminal proceedings, address the adequacy of the representation and hearings at
the trial and direct appeals stage as well as constitutional claims.
18. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH Row USA 1 (July 14, 1989).
19. The Spangenberg Group (unpublished data on the status of death row appeals on file
at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
20. Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM.
U.L. REv. 513, 521 (1988).
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the federal circuit most actively involved in death penalty litigation, 21
noted that the Eleventh Circuit granted relief in fifty percent of the first
fifty-six death penalty cases that came before them.22 He also noted, as
have other judges and practitioners, the extraordinary complexity of
post-conviction death penalty representation, calling it "the most com-
plex area of the law I deal with."23
In light of the critical importance of post-conviction review and its
complexity, it seems astonishing that there is no constitutional right to
counsel in post-conviction representation. The issue of appointment of
counsel as an essential component of meaningful access to the courts for
persons sentenced to death, which had been the subject of much debate,
was resolved negatively this term by the United States Supreme Court in
Murray v. Giarratano.24 The case involved a class action brought on be-
half of indigent, unrepresented inmates on Virginia's death row.25 The
inmates alleged that, in complex death penalty appeals, the constitutional
requirement of meaningful access to the courts required the appointment
of counsel for those inmates financially unable to retain an attorney.26
In a plurality opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Giarratano
Court found that the Constitution does not require that a state provide
counsel at the post-conviction stage.27 Despite the overwhelming evi-
dence of grave inadequacies and resulting inequities in the indigent de-
fense system, particularly in the case of defendants in capital matters, the
Court wrote: "The additional safeguards imposed by the eighth amend-
ment at the trial stage of a capital case are, we think, sufficient to assure
the reliability of the process by which the death penalty is imposed."28
Justice Kennedy, who concurred in the judgment, nevertheless
noted that "[i]t cannot be denied that collateral relief proceedings are a
central part of the review process for prisoners sentenced to death."2 9 In
his dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun, cited with approval the district court's analysis regarding the
21. Godbold, Pro Bono Representation of Death Sentenced Inmates, 42 REc. N.Y. CITY
B.A. 859, 862 (1987).
22. Id. at 873. Judge Godbold also noted that relief is probably granted in only one-third
of the death penalty cases that now come before the Eleventh Circuit. Id.
23. "You Don't Have to be a Bleeding Heart," Representing Death Row: A Dialogue Be-
tween Judge Abner J. Mikva and Judge John C. Godbold, 14 HuM. RTS., Winter, 1987, at 22,
24 (quoting Judge John C. Godbold).
24. 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989).
25. Id. at 2767 & n. 1.
26. Id. at 2767.
27. Id. at 2771.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2772 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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special circumstances in death penalty cases that require, as a matter of
due process, that death row inmates be appointed counsel at the post-
conviction stage in state court.3" The dissent also recognized that state
post-conviction proceedings are "the cornerstone for all subsequent at-
tempts to obtain collateral relief."3
After the Giarratano decision, the courts, the legal profession and
society face a growing crisis in securing counsel for these vitally impor-
tant post-conviction appeals. Without a constitutional requirement that
counsel be appointed, a growing number of death row inmates seeking
post-conviction review must look to volunteer representation as their
only hope. As Justice Marshall said:
As long as our nation permits executions, lawyers, judges and
public officials have a duty. They must assure that people who
face the ultimate sentence receive the same opportunity to pres-
ent their best case to the court that non-capital defendants re-
ceive. Until the Supreme Court will make that guarantee,
others must work within the existing system to provide that
opportunity. The task might be formidable; but the conse-
quences of any failure to undertake it are unacceptably severe.32
Several years ago, in response to the growing crisis in securing vol-
unteer counsel in these appeals, the American Bar Association created
the Postconviction Death Penalty Representation Project. The Project
has three goals. First, it seeks to educate the bar and the public about the
current lack of inmates' access to counsel in post-conviction capital
cases, in addition to the critical importance of that representation. Sec-
ond, the Project has sought to expand the pool of volunteer attorneys,
primarily civil practitioners from major firms, and to provide training
and support to those volunteers. Finally, the Project's long range goal is
the creation, in each death penalty state and in the federal courts, of a
system ensuring that all death row inmates receive effective representa-
tion, including "properly qualified, compensated, assisted and monitored
counsel."33
The American Bar Association, acting in cooperation with the state
and federal judiciary, public figures and bar leaders, has made surprising
progress in developing long-term, systemic solutions to the crisis in post-
conviction representation. In the past two years, thirteen states have es-
30. Id. at 2780 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 2779 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. Justice Thurgood Marshall, supra note 4.
33. Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Bar Association in Support of Respondents at 8,
Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (No. 88-411).
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tablished death penalty resource centers,3 4 funded by the federal govern-
ment, state governments, and private funds.3 - The centers track death
penalty cases to ensure timely intervention, keep abreast of developments
in capital litigation, and recruit, train and support the work of the attor-
neys, either volunteer or compensated, who provide representation.
More states will develop centers this year. 6
Although the resource center concept does not ensure adequate
compensation for counsel, it does ensure that inmates will receive zealous
and effective representation. It also promotes recruitment of counsel by
making representation more rewarding and efficient.
A second significant development toward a systemic solution to the
problem is the provision mandating the appointment and compensation
of counsel in federal death penalty habeas cases. That mandate, con-
tained in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 37 essentially codifies the ini-
tiatives undertaken by the federal judiciary, through the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts and the Judicial Conference, to en-
courage appointment of counsel in these cases.38
Although the resource centers and other systemic solutions will un-
doubtedly have the greatest long-term impact upon the crisis in post-
conviction representation, the response of attorneys and law firms to the
crisis is clearly the most dramatic and heartening development to date.
Literally hundreds of attorneys-without any experience in death pen-
alty or criminal matters-have willingly undertaken representation in
post-conviction cases, despite the usual absence of compensation at the
state level. In Washington, D.C., where attorneys have been particularly
active in providing counsel in death penalty cases, a group of almost one
hundred lawyers-all volunteers-meet monthly to discuss their cases
34. The thirteen states which now have operational death penalty resource centers are
Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas.
35. Federal funds are provided pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act through the Adminis-
trative Office of the State Courts. A number of resource centers receive direct appropriations
of state funds or IOLTA (interest on lawyers' trust accounts) funding. Finally, several private
foundations have also provided support to resource centers.
36. The State of Missouri's resource center proposal has been approved by the United
States Judicial Conference. That center began operations in October, 1989. In addition, a
number of states, including Illinois, Indiana, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia are
currently exploring the creation of a resource center or other mechanism which will result in
an effective system for the provision of counsel.
37. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001, 7001 (q)(4)(A)-(B), 102 Stat. 4387, 4181, 4393 (1988)
(codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West Supp. 1989)).
38. MEMORANDUM ON RECENT JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ACTION RELATING TO THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT (CJA), Administrative Office of the United States Courts, March 24,
1987.
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and to receive training on death penalty litigation.39
Several years ago, the post- conviction death penalty bar consisted of
a handful of highly dedicated and intensely over-committed experts. To-
day, those critically important full-time specialists are being supple-
mented by a cadre of enthusiastic civil practitioners. The motivations of
these attorneys vary. Some are ardent abolitionists. Others favor the
death penalty, but strongly believe that if society imposes the death pen-
alty, then society must provide counsel at every stage of the proceedings.
Some are attracted by the challenging nature of the legal work. Michael
Mello, a faculty member at the University of Vermont Law School, says
that "[o]ne of the attractions of doing death penalty work for me, aside
from the fact that I think it's extraordinarily important as a moral issue,
is that it's also fascinating and, intellectually, one of the most rewarding
areas of the law that there is."'  I
Despite the enormous time commitment and emotional impact,
post- conviction death penalty cases are appealing to many volunteers be-
cause they offer the chance to make the ultimate difference in the life of a
person wrongly sentenced or convicted. Richard Blumenthal, a former
United States Attorney, was pro bono counsel for Joseph Green Brown,
who had spent thirteen years on Florida's death row. At one point,
Brown was within thirteen hours of being executed, had been measured
for his burial suit and had ordered his last meal.41 After obtaining a last-
minute stay of execution, Blumenthal represented Brown in post-convic-
tion appeals during which, for the first time, the perjury of the state's key
witness was uncovered.42 Other significant exculpatory evidence was
also uncovered;43 Brown was released,' and is alive only because of the
efforts of his volunteer counsel.
Most volunteers, however, have simply made themselves available at
considerable personal sacrifice because the fairness of the system de-
mands it. They have responded to the pleas of Justice Marshall and
39. The Washington, D.C. group, known colloquially as the "brown bag lunch" group,
has been meeting for almost two years under the leadership of Seth P. Waxman, a private
practitioner with substantial experience in post-conviction capital appeals. Additional infor-
mation about the structure and operations of the brown bag group is available from the ABA's
Postconviction Death Penalty Representation Project, 1800 M Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20036.
40. Greenya, The Last Defense, 2 WASH. LAW. 35, 35 (Nov.-Dec. 1987).
41. 20/20: Hours From Execution (ABC television broadcast re: Joseph Green Brown
(aka Shabaka), July 23, 1987) (transcript on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
42. Id.
43. Experts found that Brown's gun was not the murder weapon. Von Drehle, supra note
11, at IA, col. 1.
44. 20/20: Hours From Execution, supra note 41.
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others. Like the American Bar Association, they believe the provision of
counsel for those on death row is society's responsibility. Until society
recognizes that responsibility, they seek, as lawyers and officers of the
court, to make the system just. In doing so, these volunteers offer the
last, best hope not only to their clients-those whom society has forgot-
ten-but also to our system of justice.
